Abstract-Over the past few years we have articulated theory that describes 'encrypted computing', in which data remains in encrypted form while being worked on inside a processor, by virtue of a modified arithmetic. The last two years have seen research and development on a standards-compliant processor that shows that near-conventional speeds are attainable via this approach. Benchmark performance with the US AES-128 flagship encryption and a 1 GHz clock is now equivalent to a 433 MHz classic Pentium, and most block encryptions fit in AES's place. This summary article details how user data is protected by a system based on the processor from being read or interfered with by the computer operator, for those computing paradigms that entail trust in data-oriented computation in remote locations where it may be accessible to powerful and dishonest insiders. We combine: (i) the processor that runs encrypted; (ii) a slightly modified conventional machine code instruction set architecture with which security is achievable; (iii) an 'obfuscating' compiler that takes advantage of its possibilities, forming a three-point system that provably provides cryptographic 'semantic security' for user data against the operator and system insiders.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS paper examines encrypted computing. That refers to a processor or other computing platform (a virtual machine, for example) that accepts encrypted inputs and produces encrypted outputs. The encrypted computing platform runs machine code programs in which the constants and possibly more are in encrypted form. A processor that supports encrypted computing in principle is suited as a platform for remote computations in the cloud [1] on behalf of a user who wants an assurance that an insider in the computer room is unable to access the data being processed. The user will encrypt the program and the input data on their own machine and send them across the network to the server, which executes it and produces the encrypted results. Those are sent back to the user who decrypts them on their own machine.
An analysis by van Dijk and Juels [2] shows that the goal of privacy and security of the user's data in this situation is equivalent to the condition that data is cryptographically obfuscated [3] from the operator and operating system as adversary on the encrypted computing platform.
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adversary on the platform an advantage in deciphering the data input to or produced by the user's program at runtime. That is as compared with the success that the attack would have if it were applied to a black box that produced the program's (encrypted) outputs from its (encrypted) inputs by fiat, via absolutely no intermediate and/or internal computational states at all. Cryptographic obfuscation means that whatever the operator's privileges are on the encrypted computing platformthey conventionally include unrestricted access to all processor registers and all memory locations at all times -they are of no advantage in cracking the encryption. If obfuscation works, being able to see the code and how it runs on the machine from step to step and being able to experiment with changing code and/or data affords no leverage to the operator. 1 So the question is if data can be cryptographically obfuscated from the operator and if the system for that is practical. The answer given here is 'yes'. This paper describes a largely conventional processor that 'works encrypted' at near normal speeds and in which the operator has all the ordinary privileges, plus a machine code, and a compiler, such that the three together provably cryptographically obfuscate user data from the operator. The complete system constitutes a platform for remote encrypted computing that maintains the privacy and security of user data against other users and the operator to the maximum extent possible. 2, 3 Its conventional aspect means that known techniques may be applied to make it work even faster in the future than the prototype already does. A toolchain and minimal operating system is already in place.
Although we do not seek to secure user data from physical probes, protection against the operator implies that some physical attacks, such as 'cold boot' (freezing the RAM sticks 1 Cryptographic obfuscation cannot always stop an adversary. Barak et al. [4] exhibited functions that cannot be disguised one as another even with obfuscation, and therefore claimed that obfuscation is impossible in general. But those functions f (x) cannot be told from f (x+A)+B in the context described here, for any constants A, B -so even if what x is intended to mean can be guessed, it is not known what number represents it under the encryption. That leaves 'wriggle room' for cryptographic obfuscation to work in the present context, despite Barak et al.'s famous result. It may be attributed to (i) inputs and outputs are in encrypted form here, and (ii) the hardware makes available only nonstandard primitive arithmetic and logical operations. 2 Keys may be embedded at manufacture, as with Smart Card technologies [5] or introduced as needed via a Diffie-Hellman circuit [6] or equivalent that loads the key safely in public view. without revealing it to even the operator. 3 There is no compromise from running with the wrong key in the machine. A program compiled with the right key does not work and a program that works' inputs and outputs are unwritable and unreadable. 978-1-5386-1585-0/17/$31.00 c 2017 IEEE for later examination) [7] , [8] , [9] are prevented. The operator has access to RAM, so defending against the operator must logically defend against cold-boot too and indeed, as that logic dictates, user data in RAM will always be encrypted.
This system is in the first instance aimed at remote offline ('batch') computation, because the same program must be recompiled by the 'obfuscating' compiler and reencrypted (but not with a different key) by the assembler whenever a new set of data is ready. However, if the future inputs are all known beforehand, a loop in the code and the one compilation suffice. Indeed, we believe that continuous operation will soon be possible. Our prognostication is that the obfuscating scheme embedded by the compiler may be varied by the user while the program is running, with no change of encryption key.
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section II describes the 'homomorphic systems' that form the basis of our approach, and gives details and measures of our particular processor design for encrypted computing. Security problems that intrinsically arise from encrypted computing are considered in Section III. Section IV offers a partial solution via a restricted but computationally complete set of machine code instructions, and Section V offers a complete and practical solution via a 'fused arithmetic' style of instruction set. Section VI introduces an obfuscating compiler. Formal statements of security (mostly without formal proof here, but sketched or referenced) against deterministic attacks are given in sections IV and V, and against stochastic attacks in Section VI.
II. HOMOMORPHIC SYSTEMS
A homomorphic system for encrypted computation is one for which the inputs, outputs and all observable internal states are encrypted versions of what would be seen in a conventional processor running the same program.
There is a simple canonical example: Ascend [10] is a prototype processor to which nobody, including the operator, has access except via its external input/output (I/O) pins. It expects encrypted data and machine code (Ascend's encryption is 128-bit AES [11] ), and it returns encrypted data. Communication with memory is encrypted, via 'oblivious RAM' [12] , [13] , [14] . The statistics with respect to external cache hits, memory address patterns, power use patterns, etc, must be 'prophesied' prior to a run and the processor works to make it come true. There are no intermediate states that can be observed. Ascend is a coprocessor (i.e., a unit called upon by the main processor for special tasks) so it runs no interrupt handlers or other operating system code. It unstoppably runs to completion an encrypted program on the encrypted data delivered to it.
The platform is effectively a black box, satisfying the Hada cryptographic obfuscation definition's requirement, but it is awkward to set up for each use, it runs 12 to 13.5 times slower in encrypted mode 4 and the suitable programs for it are limited. We would like something faster and less handicapping. 4 The Ascend processor prototype's hardware base is not a sophisticated design so its absolute speed cannot meaningfully be compared with a contemporary off-the-shelf processor, but comparing its encrypted with unencrypted running speed is a proxy for the 'efficiency' of that mode of operation. An improvement is obtained in our own homomorphic system, the KPU ('Krypto Processor Unit') processor [15] . It replaces the arithmetic unit in a conventional processor design with a non-standard homomorphic arithmetic. 5 It is shown in [16] that a processor working encrypted via that mechanism is a homomorphic system. Running encrypted, the processor's code and internal states are observable to all, but data is seen to be encrypted wherever it may be observed.
The architecture is detailed in [17] . It is a classic superscalar 6 design with a single pipeline [18] . It is modified to incorporate a non-standard arithmetic and has separate user mode and supervisor mode caches and other potential common information sources, as shown in Fig. 1 . Embedding a symmetric encryption, the non-standard arithmetic arises through a conventional ALU working on unencrypted data in 'shadow' registers, where the first of a series of arithmetic operations triggers decryption to the shadow registers and the last engages encryption back again. The hardware protocol is proved secure in [19] . The pipeline is configured in two ways for two classes of instruction, as illustrated in Fig. 2 . The 'A' configuration is for instructions that may use encryption only after arithmetic (the majority), the 'B' configuration is for those containing immediate data that need decryption first.
The block encryption fitted can be any that matches the machine word, RC2 (64 bit) and AES (128 bit) having been trialled. The data encryption is one-to-many, padding under the encryption varying pseudo-randomly. Encrypted addresses in particular can vary dynamically at runtime, producing 'hardware aliasing' from a software perspective, in which different memory locations are sporadically accessed by the same address. Programs are compiled to accommodate that [20] , [21] .
The KPU runs the OpenRISC machine code described at opencores.org/or1k/Architecture Specification, modified for encryption. The modifications principally extend some instructions to accommodate 64-or 128-bit encrypted constants. The KPU slows down by 10-40% in encrypted running under AES-128 as compared to running unencrypted (measures are from [17] ), and with its base clock set at 1 GHz (3 ns cache), it runs like a 433 MHz classic Pentium, 7 so a KPU is quite fast. 8 The KPU's nearest competitor among homomorphic systems is HEROIC [22] , which has a stack machine architecture [23] . HEROIC embeds 2048-bit additively homomorphic Paillier encryption [24] for its encrypted working. Beneath the encryption, it is a 16-bit machine. An encrypted addition takes 4000 cycles on its 200 MHz base hardware, making HEROIC's speed roughly equivalent to a 25 KHz Pentium. A KPU is about 20,000 times faster. The point, however, is that the security of encrypted computations in these systems can be mathematically backed, as explained below.
III. VULNERABILITIES OF ENCRYPTED COMPUTATION
Being able to run arbitrary computable functions encrypted is potentially dangerous to the security of an encryption. It is prima facie possible that an adversary may make some unforeseen use of the platform to subvert the encryption. That is the danger that encrypted computing must guarantee to avoid, because the data is already in encrypted form and the security offered is as strong as the encryption is, barring the extra vulnerabilities that derive from computations.
There is real danger here, because in order not to confound the programmer, a platform for encrypted computing ought to implement the familiar computer arithmetic. That means 2s complement arithmetic, for example 32-bit, in which 32 additive doublings of anything obtains an encrypted zero. Using [·] E to represent encryption: 8 The authors are not Intel or AMD, and it may be supposed that experts such as those would do far better at implementation. In that respect, the KPU prototype's slowdown of 10-40% running encrypted indicates what may eventually be achieved relative to a PC too.
Similarly 9 Or, more efficiently, by deducing its digits, comparing and subtracting 2 k from x when 2 k ≤ x < 2 k+1 . That requires only an instruction for encrypted subtraction, in addition to those for encrypted addition and comparison.
In case there are no instructions for encrypted multiplication or division, a subroutine may do the job using only encrypted addition and comparison. The subroutines will require an encrypted 1 as a constant in the code, and that may be repurposed as-is by an adversary who locates the subroutine.
So there is a case to answer with respect to security. Fortunately, the answer is positive.
IV. SECURE ENCRYPTED COMPUTATION Despite the alarms above, there are ways of running arbitrary encrypted computations securely. Consider a minimal computationally complete subset of instructions 10 consisting of addition of a constant y←x+k (in human-readable form) and branches based on comparison with a constant x<K. Consider a program C written using only those two instructions.
11 By a 'method of observation' understand a deterministic non-interfering process, based on observing what a running user program does from step to step -the trace T . Given the operator cannot read the encryption, then:
Fact 1. No method of observation exists by which the operator who does not possess the key may decrypt the output [y] E of the program C.
The proof is given in [28] . The argument 12 assumes encryption is independently secure, and the result is relative to its strength. 9 The vulnerability discussed here has been independently discovered in [25] . 10 A practitioner's 'proof' of the computational completeness of those two instructions is the mathematician J.H. Conway's well-known Fractran programming language [26] , in which those are the only instructions. Attention in the computer hardware community may have been first drawn to the fact by Patterson and Hennessy in [27] . 11 The two joined together form HEROIC's 'one instruction' machine codes. 12 The argument for Fact 1 supposes the hypothetical method has trace T and code C as inputs. Construct a modified code C such that (i) it has a trace T that 'looks the same' as T to the operator, because the differences are only in encrypted data, not control flow; (ii) the code C 'looks the same' as C too (detail follows). Then the operator's method must give the same result applied to C , T as it does applied to C, T , which is y, say. However, (iii) the new The reason is that the program hypothetically built by the operator is the kind of program forbidden to exist by Fact 1, because the output [y] E is known to be an encryption of y. It does not matter who has written the program.
That answers the natural suspicion that an attacker could turn some mechanism of the processor to the task of decrypting program data. The answer is 'no', if the instructions are just add-a-constant and branch on compare-to-a-constant. The answer is also 'no' if the attacker is prevented from running their own programs on user data, as in Ascend. The conclusion does not apply to KPUs, which support an extensive conventional instruction set, and the fix is addressed in the rest of this paper.
V. FXA INSTRUCTION ARCHITECTURE
This section introduces a FxA instruction set architecture for use in encrypted computing that makes impossible the class of attacks via chosen instructions exposed in Section III.
The KPU runs all of the standard 32-bit integer and floating point OpenRISC instruction set (there are approximately 200 different instructions) in encrypted mode, and that does leave it vulnerable to attacks on the encryption via the examples of Section III. However, there are also instructions that a KPU may safely execute, as Section IV showed. Analysis shows that binary addition, binary subtraction, subtraction of a constant, multiplications, left shifts (but not division or right shift) are all safe, provided each is atomically followed by addition of a constant. That could be enforced in the processor, but there is opportunity here to co-opt instead a combination fused multiply-add (FMA) instruction. 13 That is convenient because FMA is nowadays seen as ideal for parallel computation, having been introduced for that purpose by AMD and Intel [29] .
code C gives the output [y+7] E when run, not [y] E . So the method is wrong and does not work. The program C differs from C only in the encrypted constants [K] E in the [x<K] E test in branch instructions. Those are changed to compensate for underlying data x now universally taking value 7 more than before. Changing K in C to K =K+7 in C achieves that. Nothing else changes from C. Then C does exactly the same at runtime as C does, but on data that is everywhere [x+7] E instead of the [x] E when C runs. 13 Intel/AMD FMA instructions do x ← y * z+w.
Denote by a fused anything-add (FxA) instruction set architecture one in which every arithmetic instruction is the fused compound with addition of a constant on inputs and outputs. For example, FxA multiplication does the following:
where the k i , i=1, 2, 3 are constants embedded in the instruction. Some instructions, such as FxA binary addition, need only one constant embedded in the instruction, as
For the KPU, FxA instruction constants are embedded encrypted.
Recall that Section IV stipulates the processor must enforce no collisions between (i) encrypted constants embedded in instructions and (ii) runtime encrypted data values in registers and memory. With that, the arguments 12 for Facts 1 and 2 go through for a FxA-conformant instruction set in a KPU.
14 That is, by 'method' understand a deterministic procedure, then: An extra decode stage lets the KPU translate a FxA-compliant instruction set to OpenRISC. But deterministic methods of attack are not the only danger. An attack may fail almost always and still succeed enough times to make it worthwhile, so stochastic considerations need to be taken into account.
VI. OBFUSCATING COMPILATION
To make compilation to an encrypted FxA-compliant instruction set vary stochastically in a controlled way, the compiler sets a different offset dx l from the nominal value x l for the value [x l + dx l ] E in each register and memory location l, at different points in the program. At each recompilation of the same source, the compiler will choose offsets randomly and independently, with uniform distribution. The consequence will be that runtime values vary, with uniform distribution, between executions of different compilations. The machine code output of the compiler looks the same each time, up to differences in the embedded encrypted constants, which an adversary cannot decrypt. The traces also look the same.
Consider a boolean expression A && B in the source code. The compiler will (a) already know if A is compiled telling the truth or lying; (b) already know if B is compiled telling the truth or lying; (c) decide randomly if it will lie or tell truth for C=A&&B. The (a) corresponds to whether da=0 (truth) or da=1 (liar) is deliberately offset by the compiler for the nominal runtime value of the one-bit integer representing A. Similarly (b) corresponds to whether db=0 (truth) or db=1 (liar) is offset by the compiler for B. Let a be a symbolic expression that is true when (a) is set to tell truth (da=0), and false when where the overline means boolean negation. The compiler knows a and b and generates c with 50/50 probability, so deciding which of A&&B, A&&B, etc., it will generate machine code for. All the generated codes look the same, modulo encrypted constants, which are unreadable by the operator-as-adversary. The sequence has the classical form that a compiler should emit for A&&B. In particular, the branch takes the 'short circuit' route to an early out if A fails.
With other source code constructs, the compiler 15 randomly generates differences from nominal that span the full 32-bit range, not the 1 bit of the boolean case. That is validated here by compiling code for the Ackermann function 16 [30] and running it with (3,1) as input. The program gives result [13] E after 8922 instructions executed. Table I shows the object code with its randomly generated embedded constants picked out in brackets. For clarity in the trace (Table II) , the compiled offsets dy for the return value from functions and dx for function parameters have been set at 0, instead of being random (in which case entry dx and exit dy offsets for the whole program would be known to the remote user). That allows the trace to finish with precisely [13] E in register v0, which is OpenRISC's specified application binary interface return value register.
In [28] it is proved of this compile strategy that: It is argued in [28] that Fact 4 implies that runtime data is semantically secure [3] against the operator, assuming the encryption cannot independently be deciphered, and under the stipulation of Sections IV, V that the hardware ensures 15 Haskell code for the compiler and a virtual machine to run the object code may be downloaded from http://nbd.it.uc3m.es/ ∼ ptb/obfusc comp-0 7.hs. 16 The C source code for the Ackermann function is as follows: 
skip j instructions if flag set else continue bnf j skip j instructions if flag unset else continue b j unconditional skip j instructions jal l jump to address l, save return address in ra register The r are register indices or memory locations, the k are 32-bit integers, the j are instruction address increments, '←' is assignment. ACKERMANN FUNCTION ON (3,1) , RESULT It is planned to install an extra decode stage at the front of the KPU pipeline to support FxA instructions, now the theory of how instruction set design may provide security is understood.
The obfuscating C compiler presently only works with integer types, arrays being treated as long integers. 'Upgrading' to allow general pointers is planned, to complete the type coverage. But a given pointer must always point into its designated area, requiring a strengthened C type discipline.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has considered the security of encrypted computation on behalf of a remote user against the system operator or operating system as adversary. It has presented a fast prototype processor that, in user mode, works 'homomorphically' with respect to a conventional processor, producing encrypted outputs from encrypted inputs via encrypted internal states. A 'FxA' machine code instruction set for the processor has been described in which every arithmetic operation is fused with addition of a constant on inputs and outputs. That, in conjunction with obfuscating compilation as described here, implies the unencrypted form of data read and written by user programs cannot be deduced or even statistically estimated to any degree above chance. Our prototype AES-based system runs at about the speed of a 433 MHz classic Pentium.
